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Abstract 
Economic approaches to decision making assume that people attach values to prospective 
goods and act in order to maximise their obtained value. Neuroeconomics strives to observe 
these values directly in the brain. A widely used valuation term in formal learning and 
decision-making models is the reward prediction error: the value of an outcome relative to its 
expected value. An influential theory (Holroyd and Coles, 2002) claims that an 
electrophysiological component, the feedback related negativity (FRN), codes a reward 
prediction error in the human brain. Such a component should be sensitive to both the prior 
likelihood of reward and its magnitude on receipt. A number of studies have found the FRN 
to be insensitive to reward magnitude, thus questioning the Holroyd and Coles account. 
However, because of marked inconsistencies in how the FRN is measured, a meaningful 
synthesis of this evidence is highly problematic. We conducted a meta-analysis of the FRN’s 
response to both reward magnitude and likelihood using a novel method in which published 
effect sizes were disregarded in favour of direct measurement of the published waveforms 
themselves, with these waveforms then averaged to produce “great-grand averages”. Under 
this standardised measure, the meta-analysis revealed strong effects of magnitude and 
likelihood on the FRN consistent with it encoding a reward prediction error. In addition, it 
revealed strong main effects of reward magnitude and likelihood across much of the 
waveform, indicating sensitivity to unsigned prediction errors or “salience”. The great grand 
average technique is proposed as a general method for meta-analysis of ERPs. 
Keywords: Feedback related negativity (FRN); Event-related potential (ERP); Reward 
prediction error (RPE); Unsigned prediction error; Meta-analysis; Great grand average 
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Explaining human behavior under choice requires understanding how humans assign 
value to goods and actions. This valuation occurs at a nexus of psychological influences 
running from high level processes such as framing effects and counterfactual comparisons 
down to basic physiological influences such as satiation. It is likely to be dependent on an 
individual’s knowledge both through conscious extrapolation from experience and simple 
reinforcement learning.  
Early attempts to explain human valuation were aimed at demonstrating that choice 
was entirely rational, and embodied key axioms of neoclassical economics such as expected 
utility. This approach employed a black box methodology, observing the “revealed 
preferences” of outward behavior in favor of the underlying apparatus of valuation, and 
treating humans only “as if” they computed utilities (Friedman, 1953; Samuelson, 1937). 
These assumptions have come under attack from the field of behavioral economics, which 
has succeeded in documenting widespread and consistent deviations from rational choice. A 
fully psychological approach, behavioral economics has endeavored to open the black box 
and consider a more varied set of internal representations than the simple axioms of 
neoclassical economics. This requires extra discriminatory power.  However, behavioral 
economics still largely relies on observing behavior under real or hypothetical choice. There 
is thus a possibility that the limits of this methodology may ultimately be reached, leaving 
“too many theories chasing too few data” (Glimcher, Camerer, Fehr, & Poldrack, 2009). 
 For this reason, the emerging field of neuroeconomics uses the methodologies of 
neuroscience to test economic theories of human behavior. Since neuroscience can perhaps 
be characterized as a case of too much data backed up by too little theory, a mutually 
beneficial relationship might be forged, in which economic theories of human behavior are 
tested and supported to the degree to which the neural correlates of their terms can be found. 
This might in turn allow the replacement of the “as if” utilities of neoclassical economics 
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with fully neural descriptions. Paul Glimcher, one of the driving forces behind 
neuroeconomics has, for example, conjectured that soon enough evidence will have 
accumulated that we will be able to define subjective value in fully material terms: as action 
potentials per second, relative to a reference dependent anchoring point given by the baseline 
firing rate in specific (though as yet unspecified) populations of neurons (Glimcher, 2009). 
This is a bold stance. To what degree does the current evidence suggest Glimcher’s 
claim, or one like it, might be realized? An undoubted success story in this regard is the 
literature on single cell activity. This suggests that single cells can indeed code a utility signal 
which is independent of the stimuli that signal it, and which varies with changes in either of 
the two determinants of utility: reward magnitude and reward likelihood. Populations of such 
cells have been shown both for reward prospects (Platt & Glimcher, 1999), and their receipt 
(Schultz, 2010). 
However, such effects need to be demonstrated in larger neural structures if they are 
to be credible determinants of actual choice behavior, and be accessible by non-invasive 
techniques suitable for human subjects. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) has 
been the dominant methodology here, with over 200 papers on reward valuation published in 
the last decade, including a number explicitly investigating the terms that underlie behavioral 
economics’ pre-eminent theory: prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). These studies 
have shown that activation of certain key areas, particularly the striatum and ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex, is correlated with the value of anticipated or received rewards. However, 
individual experiments show wide variations in activated structures, with four recent meta-
analyses of the literature (Bartra, McGuire, & Kable, 2013; Diekhof, Kaps, Falkai, & Gruber, 
2012; Garrison, Erdeniz, & Done, 2013; Liu, Hairston, Schrier, & Fan, 2011) showing 
striking disparities in the broad topography of reward processing. fMRI is limited by its poor 
temporal resolution, particularly with regard to the valuation of outcomes, which, unlike the 
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decisions that precede them, are strongly temporally delimited. For this reason, the event 
related potential (ERP) technique, which shows excellent temporal resolution, has a role to 
play in the investigation of valuation in the human brain.  
The purpose of the present article is to assess the evidence that an ERP component 
known as feedback related negativity performs a neuroeconomic valuation. While this 
component has been intensively studied, inconsistencies in its reported behavior have 
obscured its true nature. It is possible however, that these inconsistencies actually arise from 
the diverse ways in which the component is quantified. We develop a novel technique, “great 
grand averaging”, that allows a common quantification of the component to be made, post 
hoc, to experiments in the existing literature. These are then subjected to meta-analysis. 
Feedback Related Negativity 
 ERP studies have revealed an electrophysiological component known as feedback 
related negativity (FRN) that has been claimed to represent valuation of an outcome. 
Specifically, it has been claimed by Holroyd and Coles (2002) that this component represents 
a reward prediction error (RPE), that is, a signed value corresponding to the difference 
between the amount of reward obtained and the prior expected value of the reward. Expected 
value refers not to the value of the most likely outcome, but rather to a weighted average of 
all possible outcomes multiplied by their respective likelihoods, and in this respect is an 
“average outcome”. Positive RPEs are produced by outcomes better than expected value, 
negative RPEs by those worse.  
Much of neuroeconomics (and nearly the entirety of behavioral economics) is 
concerned with the valuation of prospects before their receipt, since this is what is presumed 
to drive choice. RPEs can be used to investigate this question by holding outcomes constant 
but varying prospects, with the valuation of a prospect then inferred from the RPE. 
Furthermore, as RPEs are central to theories of reinforcement learning, they can be used to 
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predict future choice. A positive RPE reinforces the propensity to make the choice that 
brought it about, a negative RPE promotes the switch to an alternative. The degree of 
behavioral adjustment should be proportional to the size of the RPE, thus both the RPE’s sign 
and its size are important. Formal models of reinforcement learning (e.g. Sutton and Barto, 
1998) use such quantitative RPEs ubiquitously, and have demonstrated power in solving 
complex problems (producing world class backgammon play, for example), and model 
learning behavior very effectively. 
The FRN is a scalp-recorded electrical potential, strongest at the frontocentral midline, 
which occurs 200–350 ms after feedback on a reward or non-reward is obtained. At minimum, 
it has been shown to be a very reliable indicator of the valence of an outcome. That is, it can 
categorically distinguish between positive RPEs and negative RPEs, showing a relatively 
negative voltage for the latter. However, while this behavior is consistent with an RPE 
encoding function, Holroyd and Coles’ theory requires it to show two further properties 
beyond this categorical distinction. First, the FRN must be sensitive to how much better or 
worse than expected value an outcome is, that is, the FRN must vary in proportion to the size 
of the RPE. Moreover, since increases in the size of positive RPEs amount to an improved 
outcome, but increases in the size of negative RPEs amount to a  poorer outcome, if the FRN 
encodes RPEs on a common scale of reward it should show a valence x RPE size interaction. 
If it is responsive simply to the main effect of RPE size this suggests an encoding of absolute, 
or unsigned RPE size, that is, a response to salience. Second, the component should be 
sensitive to RPE size regardless of how this is determined. It should therefore be modulated 
by both of the two determinants of RPE size: reward magnitude and reward likelihood. 
A large number of studies have tested for these effects, as either a primary or 
secondary objective. While their methods vary greatly, broadly, a typical FRN task involves a 
series of independent trials in which participants are offered a choice of icons to select on a 
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screen, and on each occasion make a selection that they believe will maximize their reward 
for that trial. After a short delay, feedback is provided on that choice, depicting whether a 
reward has been obtained or not, or the size of the particular reward. ERPs are time locked to 
the onset of feedback for each trial and averaged with other trials of that condition for each 
participant. These individual subject averages are used as data points for statistical tests, and 
are themselves included in a grand average ERP presented in the published paper. Where the 
FRN’s further modulation by RPE size is studied, this variable is most often manipulated as a 
simple categorical variable of large vs. small RPEs. This variable is then crossed with the 
valence variable. The size of the RPE is varied using either outcome magnitude or outcome 
likelihood, or occasionally both. Typically, likelihood experiments offer a fixed magnitude 
reward which is either obtained (positive RPE) or missed (negative RPE) and manipulate 
RPE size by varying expected value, either by varying the likelihood of reward across blocks, 
or providing a cue on each trial signaling the likelihood of reward. In contrast, magnitude 
experiments typically hold expected value constant, often at a value of zero, give feedback 
indicating either a gain (positive RPE) or a loss (negative RPE), and vary the magnitude of 
the outcome.  
Note that the “negativity” denoted by the FRN component merely refers to the voltage 
of the waveform produced by negative RPEs relative to that produced by positive RPEs, and 
should not be taken to imply that negative RPEs have a privileged role in generating this 
voltage difference. This touches on an important methodological point, that ERP waveforms 
on their own can be difficult to interpret since their peaks and troughs are the sum of many 
individual components, some experimental, some incidental. For this reason, some 
electrophysiological components are described not by measuring deflections on the 
waveforms of individual conditions, but by those arising on the difference wave of two 
waveforms corresponding to the two levels of an experimental variable. In the case of the 
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FRN this variable is valence, with the component made apparent in a difference wave created 
by subtracting the positive RPE waveform from the negative RPE waveform. The simulated 
data in Figure 1 demonstrates this differencing process, and in doing so also depicts the 
predictions of the Holroyd and Coles theory. 
Figure 1 raises an important issue of nomenclature, as the FRN is typically 
operationalized as the difference between good (positive RPE) and bad (negative RPE) 
outcomes, i.e. a valence main effect. However, Holroyd and Coles claimed the FRN encoded 
a quantitative RPE, incorporating RPE size as well as valence, entailing a valence x RPE size 
interaction. To keep the distinction clear, we follow precedent in the present paper by using 
the term FRN to refer to a component responsive to the main effect of valence. We use the 
term RPE-FRN to refer to a component responsive to the interaction of valence and RPE size, 
the hypothesis under test in this meta-analysis. The simplest demonstration in support of 
Holroyd and Coles would be a single component showing both such effects in the same 
interval. However it is also possible that the effects will be asynchronous, suggesting a 
quantitative RPE encoder of the kind envisaged by Holroyd and Coles accompanied by other 
components merely coding the sign of an RPE but not its size. In the simulated data of Figure 
1, for example, the RPE-FRN in pane e occupies a briefer interval than the FRNs in panes c 
and d. This important distinction between FRN and RPE-FRN notwithstanding, at many 
points in the forthcoming discussion a point refers equally to both terms. Except in cases 
where we wish to make a point specific to the valence x RPE size interaction we refer simply 
to “the FRN”. 
Existing Evidence for Modulation of the FRN by Magnitude and Likelihood 
In their original paper, Holroyd and Coles (2002) confirmed that the FRN could be 
modulated by reward likelihood. While their claim that the FRN constituted an RPE has 
proven highly influential, at the time of its publication the supporting evidence was limited to 
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this single experiment, with no examination of potential magnitude effects. Now, after more 
than a decade of research on the FRN, we are in a much better position to assess whether 
Holroyd and Coles’ account is supported by the evidence. 
While it is not an exhaustive review, since it only includes experiments that meet our 
criteria for the forthcoming meta-analysis, the picture from Appendix 1 would appear to 
suggest that reward magnitude does not modulate the FRN in the predicted manner. For those 
studies manipulating magnitude, six experiments showed the expected effect, eight studies 
reported no effect and three showed the opposite effect (i.e. the FRN was greater for low 
magnitude outcomes). For those manipulating likelihood, the evidence is stronger, if still not 
entirely consistent, with thirteen studies showing the predicted effect and six reporting no 
effect.  
A similar review by Walsh and Anderson (2012) mirrors this picture. Concerning the 
likelihood modulator, a simple sign test applied to 25 studies showed a significant effect 
consistent with an RPE coding. In comparison, magnitude could not be shown to significantly 
modulate the FRN. The authors argued the absence of magnitude effects could be because the 
majority of experiments cued participants as to whether an outcome would be high or low 
magnitude at the beginning of each trial. Thus, magnitude effects in these experiments could 
have been lost to scaling effects. The two studies in Walsh and Anderson’s review that were 
un-cued showed at least partial support for an FRN modulated by magnitude, and on this 
basis the authors argued support for the Holroyd and Coles theory. However this very limited 
sample must be acknowledged to leave any meta-analytical basis for the magnitude 
modulator unproven. 
Problems with FRN Measurement and Implications for Meta-analysis 
The ERP technique’s poor spatial resolution means that any individual experiment 
using ERPs is vulnerable to spurious conclusions arising from overlap of the component 
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under consideration (here, the FRN) with other components occurring in the same temporal 
interval. The difference wave methodology by which the FRN is best studied will not remove 
interfering components which also code valence, nor can it remove all the effects of 
components that are even partially affected by valence. In gathering the data for this meta-
analysis, examination of individual studies’ waveforms showed a remarkable variability in 
their character, assumed to arise from differences in task, procedure and stimuli. This 
suggests that the FRN suffers from serious overlap with unknown components which might, 
quite incidentally, be responsive to any of the three factors (valence, magnitude, likelihood) 
under study. Because the sources of the component overlap are unknown in each case, a 
broad meta-analysis is therefore more robust than any single experiment. 
A serious hindrance to meta-analysis however, is the lack of consistency in how the 
FRN is quantified. In some papers it is measured by the voltage of a single peak, in others the 
difference between two peaks, in others the difference of one peak and the average of 
surrounding peaks, and in others by the mean amplitude in a set interval. Analysis is 
sometimes conducted on difference waves and sometimes on the original simple waveforms. 
Perhaps most seriously, the temporal interval in which the FRN is measured varies widely. 
Appendix 1 shows the quantification of the FRN in each of the studies used in this meta-
analysis. It was found that both mean amplitude measures and peak assignment are made in 
intervals ranging from 50 to 150 ms duration, at substantially different latencies, with some 
studies using intervals that do not even overlap. The interval 200–350 ms after feedback, 
where the bulk of the FRN measures lie, is characterized by a steep, alternating, positive-
negative-positive going waveform, and so differences in the interval in which the FRN is 
measured can have large ramifications, with waveforms from different experiments that look 
similar on the page producing opposing conclusions once they are quantified and subjected to 
a statistical test. This may lead to failures of replication. Conversely, it also possible that 
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unexpected effects may go unnoticed as a result of the interval used, leading to successful but 
unwarranted replication, and an inflating of the apparent robustness of the FRN component 
and effects associated with it. The consequence for meta-analysis is that the compilation of 
the statistical results of FRN studies would be far more sensitive to idiosyncrasies in how the 
FRN is quantified than is desirable. 
A Novel Method: Great Grand Averages 
The problem of miscellaneous measures described above prompted us to use a novel 
means of meta-analysis. Typically, a meta-analysis uses standardized effect sizes derived 
from individual research articles as replicates for some statistical test for an effect of interest 
(most typically whether the effect size is significantly different from zero). A basic 
assumption of any statistical test, meta-analytic or otherwise, is that all data constitute 
observations of the same phenomenon. In our case this phenomenon would consist of neural 
events comprising activity of the FRN component.  As previous discussed, it is not well 
established whether the neural events measured across the range of previous studies arise 
exclusively from the FRN. Moreover, the mixture of mean voltage and peak to peak measures 
and the wide range of intervals used to quantify the FRN component also raise serious 
concerns over the equivalence of effect sizes measured across the literature.  
Our meta-analysis avoided the miscellaneous measures problem by ignoring the 
quantification of the FRN the authors of individual papers had used. Instead, we took 
published grand average waveforms in all experiments that met our criteria, digitized these 
waveforms to extract their co-ordinates and averaged these coordinates across experiments to 
create composite waveforms representing “great grand average” (GGA) waveforms. While 
this approach is borne of necessity, there are nevertheless some benefits to bypassing the 
quantification provided by the original authors and going “upstream” to the published 
waveforms. One advantage is that a great deal of information is thrown away in the 
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conversion of waveforms to unitary scores of component amplitude, and the GGA technique 
retains that information up to the point of quantifying the final GGA waveform. This means 
that effects that are small or lie outside typically analyzed intervals, but which are 
consistently present, can become noticeable.  
A second advantage is the method’s potential to reduce the effects of component 
overlap. In a single ERP experiment, averaging across trials reduces the effect of incidental 
neural activity that is peculiar to a given trial, thereby accentuating task-related components, 
which are elicited on every trial. However, this does not help reduce components that happen 
to be elicited by the task, but are not the subject of the experiment. This causes component 
overlap, and complicates the measurement of the component under study. Under the GGA 
technique some of this component overlap is reduced due to the variations in the tasks used in 
different experiments. Averaging across experiments reduces the effect of incidental 
components which are peculiar to a given task, thereby accentuating the component under 
study, which will be elicited on every trial. Of course, components other than the one under 
study which happen to be elicited by the factors of an experiment (here valence, magnitude 
and likelihood) will not be reduced by the GGA technique. 
A third advantage arises from differences in the latency at which the FRN occurs in 
the pool of experiments used to create the GGA waveforms. This produces “smearing” of the 
peaks that characterize the feedback-locked ERP, reducing their amplitude and widening the 
duration of general positive and negative deflections. For the purposes of the study at hand, 
we regard such smearing as a methodological strength. This is because it reduces the 
availability of bespoke intervals in which strong, but likely un-replicable effects can be found. 
This ensures a fairer test of the RPE account. Thus what is lost in (possibly misleading) peak 
amplitude is gained in reliability. It must be noted that the advantages of this meta-analysis 
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technique are not specific to the study of the FRN, rather, they are highly generic and could 
be applied to the meta-analysis of any ERP component. 
The disadvantages of the method are that the extraction of the data directly from the 
waveforms introduces a new source of measurement error, and that disregarding the reported 
statistics eliminates the only source of information concerning the within-study variance of 
the studies entering the meta-analysis. These issues are considered empirically later.  
Moderators 
While the variability of the waveforms produced by FRN experiments has 
complicated their interpretation and presented methodological challenges, it is possible that 
some of this variation is systematically related to differences in experimental tasks, and can 
thus be used to infer properties of the component. We therefore performed the following 
moderator analyses. 
RPE modulator. Modulator refers to whether outcome magnitude or outcome 
likelihood was used to manipulate the size of RPEs. While demonstrating that the FRN is a 
generalized RPE encoder requires that it be responsive to both modulators, and so their 
effects needed to be established independently, a comparison of those effects is potentially 
illuminating since evidence that the FRN is a generalized RPE encoder would be bolstered by 
a relative insensitivity to the source of the RPE size modulation. 
Control over outcome. The expected value against which an RPE is generated might 
consist either in the expected value of the preceding stimulus, or in the expected value of the 
action performed in response to that stimulus (Balleine, Daw, & O’Doherty, 2008). That is to 
say the RPE might contribute to either Pavlovian or instrumental conditioning. This matter 
may be addressed by examining the degree to which control over outcome affects FRN 
amplitude. An RPE used in Pavlovian conditioning, perhaps reflecting a general role in 
valuation, will occur even when participants passively observe outcomes. In contrast if the 
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FRN is greatest following a meaningful action on the part of the participant this suggests a 
role in instrumental conditioning. 
Magnitude cueing. While reward likelihood is fundamentally limited to values 
between zero and one, there is no such delimitation to reward magnitude. In order to be able 
to show satisfactory discrimination across a wide range of outcome magnitudes it would 
appear necessary that the FRN scale its response relative to the range of magnitudes 
considered available in the immediate context. Such scaling has been shown by Tobler, 
Fiorillo, and Schultz (2005) in macaque midbrain neurons, which produced equivalent 
responses to rewards of different magnitudes when the range of magnitude available on that 
trial was signaled to the subject beforehand. Bunzeck, Dayan, Dolan, and Duzel (2010) found 
a similar scaling effect in a study of humans using fMRI. Schultz (2009) has suggested that 
scaling is performed not on the absolute range of outcomes possible in a given context but on 
their estimated distribution, and that RPEs accordingly represent z scores. While the question 
of scaling is of theoretical interest, it is also methodologically important since scaling effects 
may have been responsible for the absence of FRN sensitivity to magnitude in the literature. 
This moderator analysis investigated whether effects of magnitude on the FRN were reduced 
in cued experiments as would be expected if scaling occurred. 
Domain. While the FRN has a well-established sensitivity to valence, that is the sign 
of an RPE, this is formally orthogonal to the domain of the outcome, that is, whether the 
outcome constitutes an actual monetary loss or gain. For example, losses can still be positive 
RPEs if they are smaller than expected losses. A number of recent studies have suggested that 
the FRN is accentuated when measured in the gain rather than loss domain (Kreussel et al., 
2012; Kujawa, Smith, Luhmann, & Hajcak, 2013; Mushtaq, Stoet, Bland, & Schaefer, 2013; 
Sambrook, Roser, & Goslin, 2012; Yu & Zhang, 2014). This suggests the possibility of a 
neural dissociation of how outcomes are processed in gain and loss domains that is of broad 
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theoretical interest, not least because this reduced sensitivity for outcomes in the loss domain, 
or “loss indifference”, is in direct opposition to the prediction of loss aversion made by 
prospect theory.  
Methods 
Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria  
The independent variables used in this meta-analysis were outcome valence (positive 
RPE, negative RPE), outcome magnitude (high, low) and outcome likelihood (likely, 
unlikely), where this final variable refers to prior likelihood of an obtained outcome. For 
inclusion, an experiment had to contain within it a 2 x 2 factorial manipulation of valence 
with respect to either likelihood or magnitude. Where more than two levels of the likelihood 
or magnitude variable were presented in a paper, intermediate ones were ignored in order to 
maximize contrasts.  
 The dependent variable differed depending on the particular contrast examined, as 
detailed in the coding procedures section below. In all cases it was a voltage derived from the 
differencing of four simple waveforms related to the factorial design described above. 
Consequently, a key inclusion criterion was that a study must present such a set of simple 
waveforms. Waveforms had to be plotted for at least 500 ms post-feedback and 100 ms prior, 
and had to be locked to feedback, not response. Since waveforms were in many cases plotted 
at only a single electrode, and since variability of the electrode used suggested a broad 
distribution for the FRN, an experiment was included as long as it presented waveforms at Fz, 
FCz, Cz or “a frontocentral pool”. Variability was minimized by using FCz waveforms where 
available (even if individual papers reported the FRN to be maximal at a different site), and 
where they were not, using Fz, Cz or frontocentral pool in that order of preference. 
Studies using populations other than healthy non-older adults were used only if 
control data for this population were available and participants had not been selected on the 
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basis of any pre-screening (e.g. personality scales). The experiment had to offer monetary 
rewards conveyed by feedback, though tasks could vary widely, including guessing games, 
time estimation tasks and simply passive observation. Experiments could either employ 
mixed gambles comprised of wins and losses, gain domain gambles where participants either 
won or failed to win a stake, or loss domain gambles where subjects lost a stake or 
successfully avoided this. Losses and omitted rewards were classed as negative RPEs, wins 
and avoided losses were classed as positive RPEs. Where separate waveforms were presented 
for the portion of an experiment before and after participants learned a rule that allowed them 
to assess reward likelihood, waveforms for the portion after learning were used, since these 
could be expected to produce the strongest effect of likelihood on prediction errors. 
Experiments which manipulated factors other than the three of interest were included, though 
in some cases waveforms were used at one level of that additional factor, often a control level, 
if available and appropriate (see Appendix 1). 
Experiments were excluded if the factor of magnitude, likelihood or valence was 
confounded with another variable. While experiments manipulating both magnitude and 
likelihood were acceptable (and in these cases were used twice in the analysis, once for each 
modulator) they were excluded if these variables confounded each other. This was common 
in Iowa Gambling Tasks and where participants could genuinely optimize their choice. 
Experiments where the FRN was a response to observation of another’s performance were 
excluded. Magnitude experiments were considered ineligible if levels of the magnitude 
variable were blocked, since we expected this would strongly exacerbate scaling effects, with 
the FRN responding simply to the valence of the outcome at the given level of the stakes in 
that block (though in fact no otherwise eligible experiments were excluded on this basis). In 
the case of likelihood experiments, the following criteria were employed. There had to be two 
levels of the likelihood modulator either side of, and equal distance from 50% probability to 
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avoid confounding likelihood with uncertainty, a property the feedback-locked ERP may be 
responsive to (Yu, Zhou, & Zhou, 2011). If participants received explicit instruction on 
probabilities this had to be consistent with real probabilities so that there could be no 
ambiguity regarding the value of expected value that RPEs were generated with respect to. 
Experiments were excluded if participants could learn to actively avoid disadvantageous 
trials (e.g. by knowing which button to press to always ensure >50% reward probability) 
since this made unlikely positive RPEs and likely negative RPEs infrequent, introducing a 
possible confound, and also leaving participants’ motives for their sub-optimal choice unclear.  
Moderator Analyses 
Modulator. Coding of this moderator was straightforward. In those cases (k = 2) 
where both magnitude and likelihood were manipulated, the two conditions were entered as 
independent studies for this analysis. 
Control over outcome. Operationalizing this moderator was inherently problematic 
because perception of control is highly variable across people (Langer, 1975). We used three 
levels of this moderator variable, which we believed would maximize contrasts. Level 1, 
termed “passive”, covered tasks in which participants were given no opportunity to act 
meaningfully prior to feedback. At the other end of the scale, Level 3, termed “rule 
implementation” comprised tasks where actions could be performed and where feedback was 
genuinely (and therefore ultimately visibly) dependent on choice of action. Level 2 was 
termed “guessing”. This level encompassed all tasks in which participants acted but could not 
actually affect the outcome. This included, for example cases where participants had to guess 
the location of a prize, or choose the stakes for a particular trial. It is true that participants 
might have believed that they had a degree of control over the outcome, but information on 
these beliefs was generally not available. We assumed that where control over an outcome 
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was neither evidently absent (Level 1) nor present (Level 3), participants would experience, 
on average, some intermediate perception of control. 
Domain. A direct comparison of the amplitude of the FRN in loss and gain domains 
could not be made since only two studies included any pure loss domain trials. However 
many studies offered mixed gambles, in which positive RPEs were always rewards and 
negative RPEs always losses, and the loss indifference effect described earlier might be 
expected to attenuate effects in the loss portion, producing a net reduction of the FRN overall 
in mixed gambles. Domain was therefore coded with two levels. The first, “gain domain” 
comprised all cases where the worst possible outcome was no reward. The other level, 
“mixed domain”, comprised cases where monetary losses as well as gains could be incurred.  
Magnitude cuing. This analysis applied to magnitude studies only. Cued studies 
comprised all cases where participants knew the magnitude of the forthcoming feedback but 
not its valence, un-cued studies comprised cases where they knew neither its magnitude nor 
valence. A single study in which magnitude cuing was manipulated as an independent 
variable was entered into this analysis as two separate studies.  
Search Strategies 
Published data. The first author performed the literature search and assessed studies 
for suitability. A search for English language journal articles and books was performed using 
the following databases: PsychInfo, PsychBooks, PsychArticles, ERIC, PubMed and Web of 
Science. Results were compiled in EndNote. Abstracts, titles and keywords were searched 
using the term "feedback negativity" OR "feedback related negativity" OR "feedback error-
related negativity" OR "reward positivity" OR "feedback correct related positivity". 
Duplicates, clearly inappropriate journals and conference abstracts were removed without 
inspection, as were papers published prior to 1997 (the year of publication of the first FRN 
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paper, Miltner, Braun, & Coles, 1997). Two hundred and fifteen papers remained, of which 
42 were deemed eligible after checking inclusion and exclusion criteria.  
The FRN is sometimes referred to generically as an “error related negativity”, even 
though this term is more commonly used to refer to a waveform locked to subjects’ own 
responses, and indicating internal registration of a known error, rather than a response to 
external feedback. It is also sometimes referred to generically as a mediofrontal negativity. 
We conducted a secondary search using the term “error related negativity” OR “mediofrontal 
negativity” OR “medial frontal negativity”. After removing duplicates, duplicates with the 
earlier search, clearly inappropriate journals and conference proceedings, and papers 
predating 1997, 1012 papers remained. The abstracts were scanned for evidence that 
feedback locked waveforms were studied, producing 125 possible papers, of which four met 
the criteria for eligibility.  
The reference lists of all eligible papers were checked, along with those of two recent 
reviews of the FRN (San Martin, 2012; Walsh & Anderson, 2012), producing one further 
eligible paper. In total, these search criteria resulted in the inclusion of 47 datasets from 
published papers in our meta-analysis. 
Unpublished data. In an effort to include unpublished data, all first or corresponding 
authors of the selected papers were contacted with a request for unpublished data.  A number 
of other researchers were also contacted, identified as follows. Papers returned by the 
searches described above which had been rejected were re-examined, and 154 authors added 
to a contact list. A search of theses using the ProQuest Dissertations and Theses database  and 
the Ethos database returned 73 hits for the primary search string and 370 for the secondary 
one. The contents pages of these theses were read online and 17 authors added to the contact 
list. Abstracts of 56 conference papers, extracted from the searches described earlier, were 
read, and on this basis 8 more authors were added. In the course of contacting authors, a 
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further four suggestions were garnered. 171 out of 183 email addresses were successfully 
obtained by internet search and these researchers contacted. Responses were obtained from 
51 researchers. Four entirely unpublished datasets were retrieved by this process, and one 
dataset associated with a published paper in which the requisite waveforms had not been 
presented. Three unpublished studies of the authors’ own were also added. Therefore, we 
finally included 55 datasets into our meta-analysis, 47 from published data, 8 from 
unpublished data. 
Validation data. As this is the first implementation of the GGA technique, we sought 
to validate it by comparing its findings with those resulting from conventional meta-analysis 
based on standardized effect sizes. For a meaningful comparison, it was important that these 
standardized effect sizes were generated in the same fixed interval of the waveform as that 
used for the GGA analysis. Effect sizes (or their derivatives) reported in the original papers 
did not correspond to this, or any fixed interval. It was their variability that prompted 
development of the GGA technique. To carry out the validation we therefore contacted 
authors of all the 55 papers used in our GGA analysis with a request for their original data so 
that we might calculate standardized effect sizes in the designated interval ourselves. This 
request returned original data for 14 of the 29 magnitude studies and 13 of the 26 likelihood 
studies. These studies are hereafter referred to as the validation dataset. 
Coding procedures: Generating Great Grand Averages Waveforms 
Digitizing of published waveforms was performed with PlotDigitizer 
(http://sourceforge.net/projects/plotdigitizer/). Electronic copies of experiments were 
accessed, and the figures containing the requisite waveforms were enlarged and then opened 
in the PlotDigitizer software. Digitizing began by using a mouse to calibrate the minimum 
and maximum values of the x and y axis to the distance they occupied on the screen, thus 
defining the co-ordinate space of the area of the figure. The co-ordinates described by the 
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actual ERPs were extracted by using a mouse to manually lay points along the waveforms at 
approximately 5 ms intervals. These were then run through a purpose-written program 
(supplied as a supplementary file) that linearly interpolated co-ordinates at 1 ms intervals 
between the existing manually assigned ones. For every waveform undergoing the process, 
this generated a series of voltage values at discrete 1 ms intervals that made the subsequent 
process of averaging across studies tractable. The coordinates were immediately re-plotted to 
visually check that they corresponded to the original waveform they were taken from to 
prevent gross errors. All waveforms were digitized twice in this fashion, partly to improve 
accuracy and partly to allow reliability checks discussed below.  
The consequence of this digitizing process was that for each study in the meta-
analysis, we were able to recover the data that underlay the four relevant grand average 
waveforms, plus some measurement error. For the 27 experiments that were also represented 
in the validation dataset, original data replaced the digitized versions for the bulk of 
subsequent analysis. In these 27 cases the digitized versions were merely used to assess the 
degree of digitizing measurement error, as described later. 
Coding procedures: Quantifying the FRN 
The grand average waveforms that were recovered by the digitizing process were 
submitted to the differencing process shown in Figure 1 in order to establish whether an RPE-
FRN was present. As noted earlier, the RPE-FRN refers to a component responding to the 
interaction of RPE size and valence. Such an interaction is present when the difference waves 
shown in panes c and d of Figure 1 differ in amplitude. The effect size of the RPE-FRN 
component was thus the amplitude of the waveform corresponding to the difference of 
difference waves shown in pane e of Figure 1, and its significance was based on a 
comparison of the amplitudes of its constituent difference waves, i.e. those corresponding to 
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panes c and d, with this comparison made across the sample of either likelihood (k = 26) or 
magnitude (k = 29) studies. 
Difference wave amplitude is typically measured either by using the waveform’s peak 
within a set interval, or its mean amplitude within a, usually smaller, interval. To provide a 
robust test of whether an RPE-FRN was present, we used both measures. The interval in 
which the measures were taken was determined by the average of those intervals used in the 
original papers. Those studies that used a mean amplitude measure produced an average 
measurement interval of 228–344 ms, while those using a peak amplitude measure produced 
an average measurement interval of 128–460 ms. 
In addition to exploring the effect of magnitude and likelihood modulators on the 
FRN, we were interested in the effects of these variables in their own right, i.e. their main 
effects. To study these, rather than differencing the valence variable, it was collapsed out at 
each level of magnitude and likelihood, allowing the comparison of high and low magnitude 
waveforms and high and low likelihood waveforms. Thus in the scheme shown in Figure 1, 
an average waveform was created in each of panes a and b and these were then differenced 
(small RPE – large RPE) to produce an RPE size main effect difference wave. 
Statistical Methods 
Simple and standardized effect sizes. The differencing process described above was 
performed on each individual study, generating an effect size for the RPE-FRN, thus 
allowing a test for the significance of this effect size across the studies that made up the 
dataset. This process made no use of the standard deviation of the effect size within a given 
study however, i.e. calculated across the subjects of that study, nor could it do so, since the 
digitizing process only had access to grand average waveforms. As noted, this does not 
prevent us testing for the significance of the effect across studies, but does prevent the 
relative weighting of individual studies based upon the variance of their data. This is 
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generally used to down-weight the contribution from studies showing high variability on the 
basis that their estimate of the effect under question can be assumed to be less reliable. 
Conventional meta-analysis achieves this weighting up front by using standardized effect 
sizes (often referred to simply as “effect sizes”) as the unit of analysis, which down-weight 
effects when they are underlain by high variability. The standardized effect size metric in 
which this is most obviously expressed is Cohen’s d, which is the difference between two 
scores of interest divided by their pooled standard deviation. Standardized effect sizes can be 
contrasted with simple effect sizes (Baguley, 2009) or “raw mean differences” (Bond, Wiitala, 
& Richard, 2003) which, as the name suggests, are equivalent to Cohen’s d without any 
division by standard deviation. Simple effect sizes are what are produced by the GGA 
technique and what are used in the GGA meta-analysis presented here. 
Both Baguley and Bond et al. have argued the virtues of working with simple effect 
sizes over standardized ones, noting the ease with which they can then be used to practically 
guide future studies (in the present case, a simple effect size informs researchers of the size in 
microvolts that they can expect to be working with, for example) and observing that the 
standard deviations that are used to calculate Cohen’s d are themselves subject to the 
sampling error they purport to correct for. Another reason why standardized effect sizes have 
become the norm in meta-analyses is that they allow the comparison of scores derived from 
different scales of measurement, which is not an issue here, where the metric is always 
voltage. Nevertheless, the use of simple rather than standardized effect sizes is a notable 
feature of the GGA technique and we later examine its consequences using the validation 
dataset.   
Testing the hypothesis I: T-tests on GGAs. Our hypothesis was that the FRN would 
be greater when RPEs were large rather than small, as described in panes c and d of Figure 1. 
Since the criterion for a generalized RPE encoder is that it should be modulated by both 
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reward magnitude and likelihood, these two modulators were tested separately. In each case, 
a paired samples t-test was conducted of the amplitude of FRNs constructed from small RPEs 
vs. large RPEs. Four tests were done in total, on peak measures and mean amplitude 
measures of the magnitude and likelihood modulated FRNs.  T-tests were entirely analogous 
to those which might be performed on individual FRN experiments but at “one level higher” 
using grand average data as data points, rather than subject average data. 
 Because sample size differed over studies, and conventional meta-analysis typically 
incorporates this information (Field & Gillett, 2010; Hunter & Schmidt, 2004), weighted t-
tests were used. The t statistic was calculated with the standard formula for paired samples 
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The standard deviation of this difference was also weighted, as follows 
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Unless otherwise stated, all statistics performed on GGAs used weighted means and standard 
deviations. 
Sensitivity to publication bias was assessed by inspection of funnel plots followed by 
trim and fill (Duval & Tweedie, 2000) implemented in R using the metafor package 
(Viechtbauer, 2010). 
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Testing the hypothesis II: Data driven cluster randomization of GGAs. The 
analysis described above provides a fair but straightforward test of the hypothesis since the 
FRN was quantified in an interval determined a priori by the existing literature. However, it 
remains possible that this interval is a poor choice, certainly for capturing the RPE-FRN, i.e. 
the response to the interaction of RPE size and valence. We therefore used a second, data 
driven technique, that examined the full length of waveforms for evidence of an RPE-FRN 
component. As well as addressing the danger of using the wrong interval, this had the 
secondary advantage that it could extract the observed interval of the RPE-FRN post hoc. The 
multiple comparisons resulting from the analysis of the whole waveform were avoided by 
using the cluster randomization procedure of Maris and Oostenveld (2007). This procedure 
allows an entire ERP waveform to be analyzed without incurring the excess conservatism of a 
strict Bonferroni correction for each time point analyzed. It achieves this by recognizing that 
because voltages are strongly correlated at adjacent time points, the effective number of 
comparisons being made when an entire waveform is analyzed is much lower than the 
number of sample points in the waveform. First, t-tests were performed on the two difference 
wave amplitudes at each time point, and clusters of time points at which the difference in the 
difference wave amplitudes was statistically significant (p < .05) were marked as being of 
potential significance. The values of t for each time point in these clusters were summed to 
produce a cluster-level t statistic. This was then compared to a probability distribution for 
such cluster-level t statistics generated by 10,000 runs of a Monte Carlo simulation on null 
distribution data in the interval occupied by the cluster. This was used to assign a Monte 
Carlo p value to the cluster of significant t values identified at the start of the process.  
Heterogeneity of GGAs. Meta-analyses typically report heterogeneity, a measure of 
the likelihood that the sample effect sizes in the meta-analysis are drawn from more than one 
population. This is shown by a variance across sample effect sizes which exceeds that 
25 
 
 
expected from the within-study variances. Since within-study variances are unknown under 
the GGA technique, heterogeneity cannot be measured. It can however be implied by 
demonstration of the significant effect of moderators. 
Moderator analysis.  This is conventionally performed in conjunction with a 
standardized effect size based meta-analysis, something we could not do with the GGAs, as 
we could not compute standardized effect sizes. To test for the effects of moderators, we 
performed univariate analyses with the moderator as a single categorical independent variable. 
The dependent variable was the simple effect size of the RPE-FRN. Unweighted effect sizes 
were used in an ANCOVA analysis with weighting applied using the weighted least squares 
function. To maximize the power of the moderator analysis, likelihood and magnitude 
modulated studies were analyzed together. Since validation of the GGA technique (reported 
later) suggested that mean amplitude measures produced closer estimates to an ideal 
conventional meta-analysis than peak measures, only mean amplitude measures were used for 
moderator analysis. Confounding of moderators was checked using contingency coefficients 
of all possible pairs of the four moderators, and where significant χ2 values where found, 
entering the confounding moderators as covariates. 
Meta-analysis of validation data. Conventional meta-analysis was performed using 
standardized effect sizes of the RPE-FRN generated from original data obtained from authors. 
Differencing of waveforms and calculation of t values was performed in the same way as was 
done for GGAs, with t values then converted to Cohen’s d. A calculation from t values was 
used rather than direct calculation using the mean difference divided by its standard deviation 
because of problems arising from the standard deviation term of paired samples designs. As 
Dunlap, Cortina, Vaslow, and Burke (1996) have observed, paired samples designs increase 
power by reducing the standard deviation term. This makes it easier to detect an effect (t is 
increased, for example). However, the paired samples design does not change the effect’s size, 
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which is what d purports to represent. Using the paired samples standard deviation in 
calculating d therefore conflates effect size with effect significance and inflates the estimate 
of d. Since the degree of this inflated estimate is proportional to the additional power the 
paired design provides, and this in turn is proportional to the extent to which the paired scores 
move together, d can be corrected by using the correlation coefficient of the two conditions 
underlying the t-test. Dunlap et al.’s formula for this unbiased calculation is shown below and 
was used for calculation of d. Note that the r term should not be confused with an effect size 
metric. 
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Meta-analysis was conducted using the method of Hunter and Schmidt (2004), with 
studies weighted by their sample size rather than inverse variance, since this allowed the 
closest comparison with the GGA technique. A random effects model was used, due to 
concerns over the generalizability of fixed effects models (Field & Gillett, 2010). The meta-
analysis produced an estimated effect size, confidence intervals for this estimate, and, most 
importantly for our validation purposes, a significance test that could be compared to that 
produced by the GGA technique. Heterogeneity was measured using the Q statistic. Analyses 
were implemented in the macros provided by Field and Gillett (2010) apart from trim and fill 
which was implemented in R using the metafor package . 
Meta-analysis of published data. While the GGA technique is premised on the 
unsuitability of published FRN effect sizes for meta-analysis, we ran a further meta-analysis 
using published effects for illustrative purposes. The effect size measure used was once again 
Cohen’s d. Effect sizes were frequently not reported in the published papers, and where they 
were it was typically in the form of partial eta squared. Values of d were therefore calculated 
directly from reported test statistics using conventional approximations. Where the reported 
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statistic was t, the Dunlap formula above was used with r estimated at 0.5: the average 
correlation found in our validation dataset was in fact 0.49. Where the statistic given was an F 
value, that is, rather than a difference of difference waves, the RPE-FRN effect size was 
expressed as a valence x RPE size interaction, Rosenthal’s (1991) conversion was used:  
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In cases where effects were reported as “non-significant” or an inequality based on a 
canonical value such as F < 1was given, d was set to zero. If a non-canonical value of a 
statistic or p value was given (e.g. p < .06) this was taken as the actual value. Meta-analysis 
was then performed as described for the validation data. 
Results 
Modulation of the FRN by Magnitude and Likelihood. 
Figure 2 shows simple great grand average waveforms for magnitude and likelihood 
designs. The underlying data for the digitized grand average waveforms are provided as 
Supplementary Information, as are the derived difference waves that follow. These can be 
interpreted and re-plotted using the accompanying documentation. Figure 3 depicts the 
central test of the hypothesis. It can be seen from Figure 3a that the FRN for high magnitude 
outcomes is of greater amplitude than the FRN for low magnitude outcomes, suggesting that 
the FRN is sensitive to outcome magnitude in the manner predicted. This sensitivity is plotted 
as an RPE-FRN, that is, the difference of the high magnitude difference wave and the low 
magnitude difference wave. A paired samples t-test on mean FRN amplitudes in the interval 
228–334 ms revealed a significant difference (Mlow = -1.52 µv, Mhigh = -2.20 µv, RPE-FRN 
simple effect size = -.68 µv, t(28) = -4.41, p < .001). A t-test on peak FRN amplitudes in the 
interval 129–447 ms also showed a significant difference (Mlow = -2.30 µv, Mhigh = -3.11 µv, 
RPE-FRN simple effect size = -0.81 µv, t(28) = -3.11).  
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Similar comparisons for the likelihood modulator can be seen in Figure 3b, where it 
can be seen that, as predicted, the FRN for unlikely outcomes is of greater amplitude than the 
FRN for likely outcomes, again generating an RPE-FRN. The effect was significant under a 
mean amplitude measure in the interval 228–334 ms (Mlikely = -1.56 µv,  Munlikely = -3.10 µv, 
RPE-FRN simple effect size = -1.54 µv,  t(25) = -5.44 µv, p < .001) and a peak measure in 
the interval 129–447 ms (Mlikely = -2.84 µv, Munlikely = -4.65 µv, RPE-FRN simple effect size 
= 1.84 µv, t(25) = -5.62 µv, p < .001). The RPE-FRN simple effect sizes for both modulators 
under the mean amplitude measure are shown as a forest plot in Figure 4. As a further check, 
the t-tests described above were conducted on unweighted scores to ensure that the effects 
were not unduly affected by a few studies with large sample sizes. All effects remained 
strongly significant.  
The hypothesis was thus supported using a quantification of the FRN based on a 
priori intervals derived from the literature. The Maris and Oostenveld procedure was then 
used to more accurately determine the latency of the RPE-FRN specifically. For the 
magnitude modulator, a single significant cluster of RPE-FRN activity was found (Monte 
Carlo p = .0001), running from 240–341 ms, with the effect greatest at 298 ms (-.91 µv). For 
the likelihood modulator a single cluster of RPE-FRN activity was found (Monte Carlo p 
< .0001), running from 209 ms to the edge of the measurement interval at 500 ms. The effect 
was equally great at 274 and 352 ms (-1.80 µv) but much more significantly so at the earlier 
peak: t(25) = 6.46. 
Publication Bias 
Publication bias was assessed by inspection of the funnel plots shown in Figure 5. 
Because these suggested a small degree of asymmetry, albeit largely among studies with 
large rather than small sample sizes, we applied a trim and fill procedure. This was 
implemented by entering the simple effect sizes derived from GGA analyses into a 
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conventional meta-analysis, rebalancing potential asymmetry in the funnel plots by adding 
additional imputed studies, and then recalculating effect sizes. In fact, this procedure resulted 
in no additional studies being imputed, leaving effect sizes unchanged, and demonstrating 
absence of publication bias 
Moderator Analyses of the FRN 
χ
2
 tests revealed strong associations (p < .001) between three of the four moderators: 
modulator, domain and control over outcome. To test the effect of each moderator 
individually, while controlling for the effects of the others, analysis of covariance was used 
with the confounding moderators entered as covariates. Once again, a mean amplitude 
measure in the interval 228–334 ms was used. 
 Modulator. No significant effect of modulator on RPE-FRN simple effect size was 
found (magnitude: -.72 µv, k = 27; likelihood: -1.60 µv, k = 24; F1,47 = 2.92, p = .09). The 
apparent strong effect of modulator shown by a comparison of the subplots in Figure 3, and 
the means above, was due to the mediating effect of control over outcome (see below). 
Because Figure 3 also suggested the possibility that the RPE-FRN of likelihood experiments 
occupied a longer interval than that for magnitude experiments, this was investigated using a 
mean amplitude measure in the interval 335–500 ms. The effect of modulator on RPE-FRN 
in this interval proved to be narrowly non-significant (magnitude: -.23 µv, k = 27; likelihood: 
-1.38 µv, k = 24; F1,47 = 3.80, p = .057). 
 Control over outcome. A significant effect of control over outcome was found, with 
RPE-FRN amplitude increasing as control grew (passive: -.07 µv, k = 5; guessing: -.88 µv, k 
= 34; rule implementation: -2.47 µv, k = 12; F2,46 = 9.71, p < .001). Post hoc comparisons 
revealed all pairwise comparisons to be significant (p < .05). A significant effect was also 
found in the later interval of 335–500 ms (passive: -.41 µv, k = 5; guessing: -.25 µv, k = 34; 
rule implementation: -2.56 µv, k = 12; F2,46 = 7.40, p = .002). Post hoc comparisons in this 
30 
 
 
interval revealed that rule implementation produced a significantly stronger RPE-FRN than 
passive or guess designs (p < .05), but these two levels did not significantly differ. 
Waveforms of the RPE-FRN for the three levels (with modulator collapsed out) are shown in 
Figure 6. 
—insert figure 6 here— 
Domain. No effect of domain was found (gain: -1.37 µv, k = 25; mixed: -.82 µv, k = 
26; F1,51 < .01)  
 Magnitude cuing. No effect of magnitude cuing on the RPE-FRN was found (cued: -
.70 µv, k = 20; un-cued: -.59 µv, k = 8, F1,26 < .1) 
Validation of the GGA Technique 
Where an electrophysiological component is quantified in diverse ways in a literature, 
we have argued that the GGA technique is superior to conventional meta-analysis because it 
allows quantification to be made in a standardized interval. Nevertheless, the GGA technique 
suffers two potential drawbacks relative to conventional meta-analysis. The first is that the 
process of recovering original data from published figures introduces measurement error. The 
second is that the GGA technique has no access to information on within-study variability 
and treats each study as equivalent in this regard. In comparison, conventional meta-analysis 
uses standardized effect sizes which incorporate a measure of this variability, serving to 
down-weight effects found in studies with high variability. The output of the GGA analyses 
was therefore compared to the output from analyses performed on the original data obtained 
directly from authors, allowing us to assess the impact of these potential drawbacks. 
 Digitizing error. Digitizing error could be easily measured by comparing the 
digitized data with the original data in the 27 studies of the validation dataset. The difference 
between the two data sources could either be as a result of the process used to digitize the 
figures, or discrepancies between the original data and the figures used in publication. To 
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quantify the digitizing error, a second coder (naive to the hypothesis under test) repeated the 
digitizing process of the original coder for the whole of the validation dataset. This allowed 
us to assess the degree of error within a single coder (intra-coder error), between the two 
coders (inter-coder error), and between the main coder and the original data (coder-original 
error). Average errors for the RPE-FRN in the critical interval 228–334 ms were as follows. 
The main coder showed an intra-coder error of -.011 µv (SD = .099), and the secondary coder 
-.004 µv (SD = .028). Comparison of the two coders’ average scores revealed an inter-coder 
error of -.005 µv (SD =.075). Comparison of the main coder with original data revealed a 
coder-original error of .096 µv (SD = .327). Intra- and inter-coder error was very low 
suggesting that an accurate digitizing of a published figure is unproblematic. Error rates 
between the main coder and the original data were higher than between the two coders, 
implying that the main source of discrepancy lies with the preparation of graphs for 
publication. Examination on a case by case basis revealed that this was isolated to a few 
studies that would appear to have used a low-pass filter on the figure, but not the data, or a 
degree of erroneous vertical or horizontal translation of the waveform of one of the 
experiment’s conditions. However, the amount of coder-original error is nevertheless very 
modest compared to the average simple effect sizes found in the GGA meta-analysis. 
Furthermore, it should be stressed that these digitising errors did not affect the statistical 
testing applied to GGAs earlier, since original data was used in their stead. They merely give 
an estimate of the extent of the error in the remaining 27 studies for which no original data 
was available, and for the use of the technique generally.  
Meta-analysis of original data. To assess the overall performance of the GGA 
technique, an “ideal” conventional meta-analysis was conducted using the same interval as 
used for the GGA meta-analysis, but with standardized effect sizes calculated from the 
original data in the validation dataset. The results of this meta-analysis were then compared 
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to a GGA meta-analysis run on the same subsample of 27 studies. Results of both meta-
analyses are given in Table 1. Quite aside from its role in validating the GGA technique it can 
be seen that the conventional meta-analysis also strongly supports this study’s hypotheses, 
showing a significant RPE-FRN effect size under both the magnitude and likelihood 
modulatosr. With regard to validating the GGA technique here and more generally, it can be 
seen that the two meta-analytic methods give very close results in regard to significance 
testing of the mean amplitude measure. The z statistic from conventional meta-analysis and 
the t statistic from the GGA technique are very similar under both magnitude (5.36 vs 5.27) 
and likelihood (6.55 vs 6.19) modulators. For the peak measure, the ideal conventional meta-
analysis reveals the GGA technique to have been conservative. This is to be expected, as the 
GGA technique measures the peak amplitude of grand averages rather than participant 
averages, and thus is subject to greater temporal smearing due to individual differences in 
latency across participants. Note that while Table 1 reports both average standardized effect 
size under ideal conventional meta-analysis and average simple effect size under the GGA 
technique, these should not be directly compared as they are denominated in different units. 
For GGAs they are measured in microvolts, for the conventional meta-analysis, in standard 
deviations of microvolts. Effect sizes for individual studies are given in Supplementary Table 
1. Note also that the validation dataset can be considered representative insofar as there was 
no significant difference in the RPE-FRN simple effect size of studies in or out of the 
validation dataset, t(53) = 1.54, p = .13. 
Meta-analysis of published effect sizes. We also performed a conventional meta-
analysis of published effects. As previously stated, we believe this is an unsound meta-
analysis because it draws on effect sizes measured in different intervals and from quite 
different quantifications of the FRN (e.g. mean amplitude, peak of difference wave, peak to 
peak of simple waves). Nevertheless it is interesting for comparative purposes and 
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furthermore permits a quantifying of the simpler “face value” of accumulated reporting 
findings regarding likelihood and magnitude modulators. The meta-analysis was performed 
on a reduced dataset because a number of papers did not report statistics for the RPE-FRN 
effect (see Appendix 1) The average standardized effect size for the magnitude modulator (k 
= 15) was non-significantly different from zero (d = -.26 [-.80, .29], z = .914, p = .361). The 
average standardized effect size for the likelihood modulator (k = 18) was however 
significant (d = -.95 [-1.34, -.56], z = 4.82, p < .001). Standardized effect sizes for individual 
studies are given in Supplementary Table 2. 
Main Effects of Magnitude and Likelihood 
While the principal objective of the study was to test for the existence of an RPE-FRN 
by examining the FRN’s sensitivity to modulation by magnitude and likelihood, a 
consideration of these modulators’ main effects is also valuable in interpreting the post-
feedback waveform that FRN studies are likely to generate. Component overlap is an ever-
present concern in ERP experiments and we felt it was very possible that an RPE-FRN would 
be superimposed on other components responding to magnitude, likelihood, or indeed 
valence, alone. Figure 7 represents all main effects in the form of difference waves. The RPE-
FRN, calculated from magnitude and likelihood studies combined, is added for the purposes 
of comparison. Significance of main effects was determined using the Maris and Oostenveld 
technique. This revealed a magnitude main effect (Monte Carlo p < .0001), such that low 
magnitude outcomes were associated with a relative negativity in an interval running from 
124 ms to the measurement boundary of 500 ms, with the  effect greatest at 322 ms (-2.10 
µv). Also revealed was a significant main effect of likelihood (Monte Carlo p < .0001), such 
that high likelihood outcomes were associated with a relative negativity in an interval running 
from 299 ms to the measurement boundary of 500 ms (Monte Carlo p < .0001), with the 
effect strongest at 426 ms (-3.51 µv). Finally there was a main effect of valence (Monte Carlo 
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p < .0001), i.e. an FRN, in the interval 150–401 ms, with the effect greatest at 276 ms (-2.27 
µv).  
Discussion 
The RPE-FRN and Main Effects of Valence, Magnitude and Likelihood 
Holroyd and Coles (2002) proposed that the FRN encoded an RPE. The results are 
consistent with this claim. FRNs created from large RPEs were of greater amplitude than 
those from small RPEs, both when RPE size was modulated by magnitude, and by likelihood. 
The demonstration that the FRN is responsive to variations in magnitude is important because 
it is a key requirement of a general RPE encoder, and evidence in previous experiments has 
largely been against this. The present meta-analysis shows that once quantification of the 
FRN is standardized, a clear magnitude effect on the FRN can be seen.  
A number of recent papers have reported evidence consistent with the FRN 
constituting an unsigned prediction error or “salience” encoding (Hauser et al., 2014; Oliveira, 
McDonald, & Goodman, 2007; Talmi, Atkinson, & El-Deredy, 2013; Talmi, Fuentemilla, 
Litvak, Duzel, & Dolan, 2012). Such a component should show a strong main effect of RPE 
size (i.e. of likelihood and magnitude) but no main effect of valence, and no interaction of 
RPE size and valence (i.e. no RPE-FRN), since unsigned prediction errors should be 
insensitive to valence. The present study refutes this claim. Nevertheless, salience is clearly 
coded in the post-feedback waveforms, as shown by the strong main effects of likelihood and 
magnitude in Figure 7, with these main effects approximately twice the size of the RPE-FRN 
to which each modulator contributes. The later time course of these effects suggests that they 
may well be P3 effects. 
Regardless of their source, the fact that multiple components contribute to activity at 
frontocentral electrodes touches on an important conceptual point. This meta-analysis shows 
that frontocentral activity in the interval in which the FRN is typically measured is responsive 
35 
 
 
to the main effects of magnitude, likelihood and valence, and also to the interaction of 
valence with both magnitude and likelihood. It appears that multiple components operate in 
this interval. However the debate following the publication of Holroyd and Coles’ theory has 
crystallized around the idea of a single component in this interval, whose character will 
ultimately be resolved through careful experimentation. In practice, we suspect that the 
character of the component described by a given experiment as the “FRN” will depend 
strongly on the interval in which this component is measured. For example, in Talmi et al’s 
and Hauser et al’s papers, evidence was presented favoring a salience account, however 
measurement was made at the latency of maximal FRN amplitude, that is the maximal main 
effect of valence. While this was a pragmatic choice and based on precedent, this latency was 
nevertheless not necessarily one best suited to demonstrating an RPE-FRN if there was one to 
be found, since that is shown by a valence x RPE size interaction, not a valence main effect. 
In practice, this resulted in these papers measuring effects at ~220 ms. However, this was 
prior to the period where the RPE-FRN was observed in this meta-analysis but where salience 
effects were marked in magnitude and close to significance for likelihood. In the FRN debate 
generally, we suspect that the sensitivity of the FRN to the key factors that are used to infer 
its function has depended on the latency of its measurement to a degree which has not been 
fully appreciated. 
It is possible that in the future, separation of these components may be assisted by 
improved knowledge about their scalp distributions. Because of the limited and variable 
electrode arrays available, the present meta-analysis cannot offer guidance here. Furthermore, 
the FRN itself is partly defined by being maximal over frontocentral sites. Given that is a 
now well-established definition, it is likely any published example of the FRN would also 
have to demonstrate a frontocentral maximum, in order to be accepted as such. Therefore any 
meta-analysis of the FRN would be very likely reflect this established scalp distribution. In 
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contrast, it seems likely that the later strong likelihood effect, and possibly magnitude effect 
shown in Figure 7 are P3 effects and would be maximal at more parietal locations.  
 The RPE-FRN was stronger when participants were engaged in a task over which 
they had reason to believe they enjoyed some control. In the strongest case of control, where 
participants implemented a known rule, the RPE-FRN also lasted much longer, as can be seen 
in Figure 6. These results suggest the possibility that the RPE-FRN might be selectively 
recruited by the apparatus of instrumental conditioning, rather than acting as a general 
purpose representation of value. Some caution must be exercised in regard to this finding, 
first, because subjective involvement was probably lower with reduced control (Yeung, 
Holroyd, & Cohen, 2005) and, second, because ten of the twelve studies used for the “rule 
implementation” level of this moderator came from experiments conducted by just two 
authors.  
 The RPE-FRN in magnitude studies was unaffected by whether the magnitude of the 
forthcoming outcome was cued in advance. As such, it appears that the RPE-FRN does not 
scale RPEs to the range of outcomes on a given trial. We do not believe this should be 
regarded as evidence that RPEs are genuinely coded on an absolute scale however, since this 
would be functionally extremely limited and is biologically implausible. Scaling, or 
“adaptation”, is a ubiquitous feature of sensory processes, allowing, for example, the eye to 
discriminate luminance over nine orders of magnitude despite only three orders of contrast 
being available at a given moment. We would expect such a solution to be used for 
evaluating RPEs, which likewise have a very broad range  As such, this moderator analysis 
suggests that outcomes are not scaled to the range of magnitudes available on a trial, but the 
wider context of the experiment. Nevertheless, this is an interesting result, since it suggests 
that the expected value term against which RPEs are calculated may not simply be inherited 
from the midbrain dopamine system, or at least those midbrain dopaminergic neurons that 
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have shown strong scaling effects (Tobler et al., 2005), and is thus relevant to the ongoing 
question of the afferents of the FRN. 
Applications of the present findings 
 The FRN is a robustly elicited component, easy to study in human participants, and 
appears to encode an RPE. It may thus contribute to the daunting task of uncovering the 
network of neural events that give rise to subjective valuation by humans. Holroyd and Coles’ 
theory of the FRN was focused on its role in reinforcement learning, rather than its role as a 
general index of subjective value. The relationship between reinforcement learning and 
valuation is close however. The information concerning action-reward contingencies that is 
held in a reinforcement learning system presumably strongly informs the valuation of the 
actions available to people in a given situation. Thus, if it can be measured (e.g. by the FRN) 
it is has predictive power for human choice of the kind that neuroeconomics strives to attain. 
The nature of the reinforcement learning system underlying the FRN is therefore 
pertinent. Reinforcement learning falls into two broad classes, model-free and model-based. 
Model-free reinforcement learning assigns values to actions based on the net reward they can 
expect to incur, without consideration of the actual outcomes that are produced. The values 
are updated in light of RPEs, but are termed “habit values” because they encode only the 
historical value of an action. Such learning is computationally efficient and information poor 
because the structure of rewards and the probabilities that follow an action is cached into a 
single value. Model-based reinforcement learning uses a model of the environment which 
represents actions, rewards, and intermediate states, and calculates values of actions by a tree 
search of this model. While more computationally expensive, this can be more quickly 
updated. A recent review of model-free and model-based reinforcement learning is provided 
by Walsh and Anderson (2014). 
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 The relevance of this distinction to human choice is that model-based reinforcement 
learning is likely to be continuous with general cognition (Chater, 2009). Thus the degree to 
which choice on any one occasion is influenced by wider knowledge, by deliberative 
reasoning, or by verbal instruction will depend on the degree to which a model-free habitual 
system or a model-based belief system is dominant at that time. If the FRN can be established 
as belonging to one system or the other, it can be used as a much more direct means to 
investigate the relative contributions of habitual and belief based valuation to behavior, and 
assist in accounting for variations in both inter- and intra-individual choice that elude the 
revealed preferences method. 
While the present demonstration that the FRN encodes an RPE places the debate on a 
much firmer footing, there has nevertheless been limited work on this important question. 
Hajcak, Moser, Holroyd, and Simons (2007) and Moser and Simons (2009) both showed a 
relationship of FRN amplitude to RPEs generated against subjective predictions but not to 
reinforcement history, implying the component might arise from model-based reinforcement 
learning, while Ichikawa, Siegle, Dombrovski, and Ohira (2010) found comparable 
contribitions of subjective prediction and reinforcement history to FRN amplitude. However, 
Walsh and Anderson (2011b) found persuasive evidence against model-based reinforcement 
learning. They compared the FRN in cases where participants received verbal instruction on 
choice- outcome contingencies to cases where they did not. In the instruction condition, 
participants used this instruction, as shown by their behavior, thus adopting the given 
“model”. However, when unexpected outcomes, that is model-based RPEs, occurred, the 
FRN was initially insensitive to these. Its sensitivity developed only at the rate shown in the 
no-instruction condition suggesting it was dependent on a model-free history of 
reinforcement. A number of other authors have been able to show that FRN amplitude 
corresponds to the size of RPEs derived from a model-free reinforcement learning algorithm 
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(Chase, Swainson, Durham, Benham, & Cools, 2011; Cohen & Ranganath, 2007; Philiastides, 
Biele, Vavatzanidis, Kazzer, & Heekeren, 2010). Other evidence for a model-free basis for 
the FRN comes from the demonstration that dopamine, the neurotransmitter implicated in 
generating the FRN, promotes model-free rather than model-based reinforcement learning 
(Wunderlich, Smittenaar, & Dolan, 2012). On current balance the evidence favors the FRN’s 
role in model-free reinforcement learning. 
Insofar as model-free reinforcement learning is computationally cheap, it might be 
expected to occur by default, and indeed, to continue to compute valuations and associated 
RPEs even when a superior model-based reinforcement learning system was guiding 
behavior. Bayer and Glimcher (2005), for example, showed that midbrain dopaminergic 
neurons, which are believed to underlie the FRN, showed firing patterns consistent with a 
model-free RPE and continued to behave in this fashion even when their effect on behavior 
was weak. In the case of the FRN itself, the component has in some cases been shown to 
predict choice in a way that is consistent with reinforcement learning (Cohen & Ranganath, 
2007; Van der Helden, Boksem, & Blom, 2010; Yasuda, Sato, Miyawaki, Kumano, & 
Kuboki, 2004), but in other cases it has not (Mars, De Bruijn, Hulstijn, Miltner, & Coles, 
2004; Mas-Herrero & Marco-Pallarés, 2014; San Martín, Appelbaum, Pearson, Huettel, & 
Woldorff, 2013; Yeung & Sanfey, 2004). In particular, Chase et al. (2011) showed that in a 
reversal learning task, the nature of which would be expected to engage model-based 
reinforcement learning, an FRN was observed that was well described by model-free 
reinforcement learning but which nevertheless did not predict behavior, suggesting it was 
over-ridden by a model-based system. Findings such as these suggest that the FRN might be 
used to predict behavior in situations promoting relatively automatic, fast judgments, what 
has been described by dual process theories as System 1 (Kahneman, 2003). Such valuation 
has been under-represented by the traditional methods of behavioral economics, which rely 
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on stated (rather than observed) preferences in one-shot (rather than repeated) choices, which 
place prominence on deliberative processing. Perhaps the most serious challenge that the 
studies cited above pose for behavioral and neoclassical economics however, lies in the 
possibility that rather than value being constructed from multiple terms, as is suggested for 
example by prospect theory, quite separate independent valuations might be constructed 
which have differential access to behavior depending on circumstances. 
 Even while the precise nature of the valuation associated with the FRN remains 
unresolved, it may nevertheless serve as a biomarker for subjective value. It has been 
proposed in this regard for a range of psychopathologies such as hypomania and depression 
(Bress, Smith, Foti, Klein, & Hajcak, 2012; Mason, O'Sullivan, Bentall, & El-Deredy, 2012) 
2012) and pathological gambling (Hewig et al., 2010). Furthermore, a number of recent 
studies have shown that variation in dopaminergic genes affects the component (e.g. Foti & 
Hajcak 2012, Marco-Pallarés et al., 2009) raising the possibility that it might be used to 
investigate the proximate basis of genetic effects on behaviour. With the advent of mobile 
electroencephalography (EEG) setups that can be ready to use within minutes, the FRN may 
also provide a useful general measure of the subjective value of an outcome even in studies in 
which the brain is not the principal focus, much as other psychophysiological techniques such 
as skin conductance and pupillometry are used more broadly. As a dependent variable of 
subjective value it has a number of advantages over self-report. Asking subjects to report on 
their valuations brings in extra processes which generally undermines the ecological validity 
of the study of “on-line” evaluation. Reported valuations may be subject to demand 
characteristics since participants are likely to be aware of at least some norms in economic 
preference, such as avoiding obvious inconsistencies and intransitivities. Self-report may also 
be affected by what reference point stated valuation is taken with respect to, which depends 
in turn on the framing of the question used to prompt self-report.  
41 
 
 
Alternative Accounts of the FRN 
A number of tasks elicit a frontocentral negativity, or N2, at the latency of the FRN 
(see Folstein and Van Petten, 2008, for a review), and as such, alternative accounts of the 
FRN exist. One of these is that it is merely an oddball, detecting the unexpectedness of events. 
This is rather close to the claim that it simply codes salience which has been disconfirmed in 
this meta-analysis. Attempts to experimentally dissociate the FRN and N2 oddball have met 
with some success (Holroyd, Pakzad-Vaezi, & Krigolson, 2008; Warren & Holroyd, 2012).  
The N2 is believed to indicate activity in the anterior cingulate cortex (Nieuwenhuis, 
Yeung, Van Den Wildenberg, & Ridderinkhof, 2003; Yeung, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2004). 
Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, and Cohen (2001) have claimed that the ACC is responsible 
for cognitive control, becoming active when response conflict occurs, and Brown and Braver 
(2005) have made the related claim that the anterior cingulate cortex detects the likelihood of 
errors. Indeed, circumstances in which cognitive control and error likelihood are high do 
increase N2 amplitude, for example on no-go trials in a go/no-go task (Folstein & Van Petten, 
2008). The theories can account for the FRN’s response to reward if non-reward is regarded 
as an error, thus signaling the need for increased cognitive control. Furthermore, a different 
component, the error related negativity shares a common scalp distribution with the FRN, and 
is strongly implicated in these functions, inasmuch as it indicates internal registration of an 
error. In fact, Holroyd and Coles’ theory also specifies a functional relationship between 
these two components, arguing that they both reflect RPEs arising from a sudden revision of 
reward expectation, either by external feedback in the case of the FRN or internal monitoring 
in the case of the error related negativity.  
A further alternative account of the FRN is that it is an affective rather than economic 
response to outcomes (Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; Luu, Tucker, Derryberry, Reed, & 
Poulsen, 2003).This is rather difficult to disentangle from the RPE account because of the 
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affective nature of reward. However, those studies that have compared affective ratings of 
outcomes with the FRN amplitudes associated with them have tended to find a poor 
relationship (Li, Han, Lei, Holroyd, & Li, 2011; Sambrook et al., 2012; Yang, Gu, Tang, & 
Luo, 2013). 
Implications for the Measurement of the RPE-FRN and FRN 
We have distinguished between a response simply to valence, the FRN, well 
established in the literature, and a neural response to the valence and size of an RPE, the 
RPE-FRN, for which we have presented evidence here. The distinction is important for the 
testing of Holroyd and Coles’ theory. However it is not widely made in the literature and the 
comments below apply equally to both FRN and RPE-FRN 
The present meta-analysis revealed a wide variation in methods used to quantify the 
FRN, and we have noted the role this may play both in failures of replication and inflation of 
false positives. We have also noted the variability of the waveforms themselves. These two 
aspects are linked insofar as inconsistencies in FRN quantification possibly reflect the 
genuine attempt to best tailor analysis to a component of seemingly inconsistent character on 
an experiment-by-experiment basis. However, if, as we have argued, variability in the 
waveforms largely reflects the vagaries of component overlap rather than real variability in 
the FRN, then this latitude in quantification is harmful. For example, in the present meta-
analysis, P2 and N2 peaks varied so much in their latency across experiments that while we 
initially intended to apply the GGA technique to a peak to peak measure, implemented in 
standardized intervals, we were unable to do so. This illustrates the point that whilst peaks 
might provide compelling landmarks by which to detect the FRN in any individual study, the 
lack of consistency across studies suggests the benefits of locking FRN quantification to 
simple waveform peaks may be illusory. The loose relationship between single waveform 
peaks and the underlying components has been cogently described by Luck (2005).  
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As such, measures based on difference waves are to be preferred. For the specific case 
of the RPE-FRN, a measurement interval of 270–300 ms is suggested by the present study 
since this captures the strongest effects of both magnitude and likelihood and is thus the best 
estimate of the RPE-FRN’s latency. However the RPE-FRN in individual experiments may 
be subject to genuine latency differences and so, based on the course of the effect under both 
modulators, the interval 240–340 ms may be more appropriate. It should be noted that studies 
which more effectively decompose waveforms into constituent components, for example 
using principal components analysis, may reveal a rather different latency for the underlying 
RPE encoder, or encoders. Indeed Figure 7 suggests that such decomposition may well be 
necessary to fully isolate the individual components. 
Evaluation of the GGA technique 
The GGA technique was developed because the great variety in how the FRN was 
quantified rendered conventional meta-analysis highly problematic. It is worthwhile assessing 
how this technique performed, partly in judging the present findings, but also for its future 
use in ERP meta-analysis. First, our concerns regarding the conventional meta-analysis of the 
FRN using effect sizes derived from diverse quantifications proved justified. When such a 
meta-analysis was performed it failed to find a significant effect of magnitude on the FRN, 
despite this effect being strongly present in an ideal conventional meta-analysis on original 
data. In contrast, the GGA technique was in close agreement. The conclusion we draw from 
the superior performance of the GGAs is that it is more important to employ an appropriate 
and consistent quantification of a component than to have access to the measures of within-
study variance that use of published statistics provides. Of course the ideal meta-analysis 
achieved both of these objectives. However the GGA technique only requires access to 
published data. This has a great number of advantages. Most importantly, it avoids the large 
reduction in sample size that reliance on original authors inevitably entails. It substantially 
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reduces the effort required to acquire data and convert it to a common format, and makes no 
demands at all on the original authors. It removes the uncertainty surrounding the number of 
studies that the meta-analysis will contain, allowing the viability of the exercise to be 
assessed in advance. It avoids the danger of bias arising from authors selectively complying 
with the request for original data depending on what they perceive the meta-analyzer’s 
hypothesis to be. Finally, the technique can be used to guide the development of future work. 
If an effect, component, or other subset of the ERP in a published study was not selected for 
analysis within that study, there will not be any effect sizes on which to base a traditional 
meta-analysis. The GGA technique allows for post-hoc exploration of published ERPs, 
allowing the researcher to approximate the effect sizes of previously disregarded data to 
guide the design of new empirical study, theory, or analysis technique. It is for this reason 
that we have made available the FRN grand averages used in this meta-analysis as 
supplementary files. 
 The GGA technique has some disadvantages. Simple, rather than standardized effect 
sizes were used, meaning that the GGA meta-analysis could not down-weight studies with 
large variance, thus introducing some noise into hypothesis testing. The extent of this can be 
simply estimated from the validation dataset by calculating the correlation coefficient of the 
simple effect sizes of the GGA technique and the standardized effect sizes of the ideal 
conventional meta-analysis: the lower the correlation, the greater the noise introduced by 
failure to use standardized effect size. The value was r = 0.8, suggesting a moderate degree of 
noise introduced. This is, however, an overestimate of the problem insofar as standardized 
effect sizes themselves are not perfect because the standard deviations they are built from are 
themselves subject to sampling error. The remaining source of noise in the GGA technique 
consists in deviations between the digitized waveforms used for the meta-analysis and the 
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original data, however comparisons with the validation dataset set suggest this is relatively 
small.  
It should be noted that differences between experiments regarding the reference 
electrode, filters and baseline do not impact on the GGA technique since all contrasts and 
simple effect sizes are generated within-experiment, and so these extraneous factors can never 
become confounds for the simple generic reason that they are held constant at the point of 
generating simple effect sizes. It is true that FRN amplitude itself may be affected by these 
parameters, and that a poorly chosen reference electrode, for example, might reduce FRN 
amplitudes overall, concomitantly reduce effect sizes, and assist in rendering a meta-analysis 
non-significant. However in this regard GGAs do not differ from conventional meta-analysis. 
We simply note that because reference electrode is held constant within each study it does not 
confound the simple effect size generated for that individual study, and since this meta-
analysis is simply a collation of such simple effect sizes it likewise cannot be confounded by 
reference electrode. 
  We propose the GGA technique as a general method for meta-analysis of ERP 
components, not just the FRN. While inconsistency of measurement has been shown to be a 
particular problem for the FRN, this is also likely to be true to some degree of other 
components. Furthermore, even when conventional meta-analysis is applied, we still propose 
that this to be performed in concert with a GGA analysis, to check there is no gross difference 
in results. As an accompanying method it also has the advantage that it allows the plotting of 
a waveform to accompany the reported effects. Individual ERP experiments ubiquitously plot 
an entire waveform despite their reported effects occurring in a small portion of the 
waveform since it provides a “sanity check” that the ERP shows a representative character 
and that the interval chosen for analysis is reasonable. A GGA waveform serves the same 
function in the case of a meta-analysis. 
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Conclusion 
 
Neuroeconomics attempts to explain valuation by the brain. The present study 
addressed this question at the relatively large scale of EEG. It found that an easily-elicited 
electrophysiological component, the FRN, behaved in manner consistent with it representing 
valuation of an outcome. Because of the temporal precision of EEG and the inherent benefits 
of convergent evidence from different methodologies, it is to be hoped that further study of 
the FRN will assist in uncovering the full picture of how the brain represents subjective value. 
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Figure 1. How the FRN is studied. Panes a and b show grand average waveforms for four 
experimental conditions taken from a 2 x 2 design manipulating valence (positive RPEs vs. 
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negative RPEs) and RPE size (large vs. small). A given experiment would manipulate RPE 
size using either outcome magnitude or likelihood. The simple waveforms in panes a and b 
show complex peaks which are the result of consecutive, overlapping components, many of 
which are unknown. Difference waves (FRNs), constructed by subtracting the positive RPE 
outcome waveform from the negative RPE outcome waveform are shown in panes c and d. 
These control for components unrelated to valence, allowing the valence effect to be more 
clearly seen. Comparison of panes c and d also suggests that the amplitude of the FRN in 
these data is sensitive to RPE size. This is definitively shown by differencing the difference 
waves in pane e. Collectively, the figures represent the prediction of Holroyd and Coles’ 
theory, with pane a corresponding to low magnitude or likely outcomes and pane b to high 
magnitude, or unlikely outcomes 
64 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Simple waveforms for a) magnitude experiments, b) likelihood experiments. Only 
100 ms of baseline is shown, explaining how the baseline has become negative overall.  
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Figure 3. Modulation of the FRN by a) magnitude, and b) likelihood. Difference waves 
(FRNs) are created from negative RPE minus positive RPE waveforms. The RPE-FRN 
simple effect size is the difference of the two difference waves 
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67 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Forest plot showing RPE-FRN simple effect size in a) magnitude and, b) likelihood 
designs. Simple effect size was measured by mean amplitude in the interval 228–334 ms. The 
size of squares indicates the sample size, which also constituted the weighting in the GGA 
meta-analysis. The diamond shows average weighted simple effect size and 95% confidence 
intervals. No confidence intervals could be computed for individual studies because of the 
GGA technique used. 
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Figure 6.  RPE-FRN at different levels of the “control over outcome” moderator: a) simple 
effect size, b) significance of simple effect size
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Figure 7. Main effects of magnitude, likelihood and valence (RPE-FRN shown for 
comparison). 
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